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Research ReportNo. 001

“Takaichi Disarmament”? The Debate over the Defense Budget ahead of the Revision of Japan’s Three Security Documents

Yutaro KobayashiCo-Representative of the Group / Student, Keio University

This is an English translation of the original Japanese report. Read the original (Japanese).

Honor guard ceremony at the Ministry of Defense
Source: Ministry of Defense of Japan, official X account (https://x.com/ModJapan_jp/status/2095077696330145832), modified

Introduction

Work on revising the three security documents formulated in December 2022 (the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program) entered its final stage ahead of a decision at the end of 2026, and a substantial increase in defense spending had been expected under the next Defense Buildup Program. On November 13, however, it was reported that the Ministry of Finance had presented the Ministry of Defense with a benchmark placing total defense spending for the five years from FY2027 in the 50-trillion-yen range.1 This benchmark falls far short of the 70–80 trillion yen plan that had surfaced in some quarters. The reports came as a bolt from the blue to the Ministry of Defense and to stakeholders in various fields who had understood the fundamental reinforcement of defense capabilities to be the administration’s policy, and they have provoked controversy, including pushback from within the ruling parties. This paper reviews the course of the revision of the three security documents that led to the current debate and examines its background and implications.

1. How the Debate over Increasing Defense Spending Unfolded

In its first policy speech (October 24, 2025), the Cabinet of Sanae Takaichi, launched on October 21, 2025, announced that the three security documents formulated in December 2022 would be revised ahead of schedule, within 2026. It also announced that the level of 2% of GDP for defense-related expenditures and related expenses combined, which the National Security Strategy had set to be reached in FY2027, would be brought forward and secured within FY2025, together with a supplementary budget.2

In response to these political moves, arguments in favor of increasing defense spending gained momentum. The Ministry of Defense pointed out that the current Defense Buildup Program faced not only rising procurement costs caused by soaring prices and the weak yen but also shortfalls in funding for sustainability and staying power, such as stockpiling ammunition and fuel, hardening facilities, and improving the treatment of personnel, and it expressed the view that a substantial expansion in scale was indispensable under the next program. This concern was voiced repeatedly by the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) defense policy caucus, retired Self-Defense Forces officers, think tanks, and the defense industry, and discussion premised on a level exceeding 2% of GDP in the next three security documents came to be treated as an all-but-settled course.

In the general election of February 8, 2026, the LDP, campaigning on a pledge of “zero consumption tax on food for two years,” won a landslide, securing 316 seats and exceeding two-thirds of the seats on its own.3 In response, at an extraordinary Cabinet meeting on August 5 the government adopted a basic policy to lower the tax rate on food and beverages, currently 8%, to 1% for a limited period of two years from April 2027, and to make it “effectively zero” by combining this with benefits for low- and middle-income earners equivalent to the 1% in tax revenue.4 As discussed below, this consumption tax cut set the stage for the debate over funding defense spending to be pushed down the agenda.

2. Market Reactions and Fiscal Constraints

On September 15, 2026, it was reported that the Japanese government was considering setting a new medium-term target of raising defense spending to 3.5% of nominal GDP. Following the report, the yield on 10-year government bonds rose 4.5 basis points from the previous day to 3.03%, the highest level since 1996.5 Yields continued to climb thereafter, and on September 25 they briefly reached 3.115%, the highest level in about 30 years, since August 1996.6 Rising oil prices and higher long-term US interest rates also contributed to the rise on September 15, but it has been pointed out that the 3.5% report heightened concerns about fiscal deterioration and helped push government bond yields higher.7

The government was reported to be planning to keep new government bond issuance in FY2027 to around 40 trillion yen, roughly the same as in FY2025 (after the supplementary budget),8 and it was pointed out that failing to secure funding for defense spending without relying on additional bond issuance could again provoke a harsh market reaction.9 The experience of the “3.5%” report being perceived as a fiscal risk in the government bond market made it visible, inside and outside the government, that a substantial increase in defense spending could trigger a market reaction, and it is likely to have lent persuasiveness to the Ministry of Finance’s logic of capping the total amount.

3. The Takaichi Administration’s Choice

On November 2, it was reported that a plan to set total defense spending for the five years from FY2027 to FY2031 at 70–80 trillion yen had emerged within the government and the ruling parties.10 This would be up to about 1.8 times the roughly 43 trillion yen total of the current program. Those involved in defense and security had welcomed such an increase in defense spending.

On November 13, however, the Mainichi Shimbun reported that Prime Minister Takaichi had indicated to those around her a cautious stance toward a “substantial tax increase,” and that a plan for 50–60-odd trillion yen over five years had emerged within the administration.11 According to a detailed Reuters report on the same day, a senior official at the Prime Minister’s Office who had seen reports of the 70–80 trillion yen plan questioned a Ministry of Defense official in early November, and shortly afterward the Ministry of Finance presented a figure in the 50-trillion-yen range as a realistic amount.12 Jiji Press, by contrast, reported that a senior official at the Prime Minister’s Office had pointed out that the Ministry of Finance’s 50-trillion-yen-range plan would amount to a de facto reduction once exchange-rate movements were taken into account and could not be explained to other countries, suggesting that a tug-of-war over the budget was continuing among the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Defense.13

Since then, multiple media outlets have reported that a total of 50–60-odd trillion yen for FY2027–2031 is being floated, and criticism that this is insufficient has been mounting within the ruling parties.14

What deserves attention is the process through which the gap between Prime Minister Takaichi, who is cautious about tax increases for defense, and those in the defense and security community, who take a substantial increase in defense spending for granted, came to the surface. According to Reuters, the perceptions of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Defense were left misaligned until just before the year-end revision of the three security documents because the Prime Minister had prioritized securing funding for the “two pillars” of a consumption tax cut on food and beverages and growth investment. The Prime Minister had set out early on a policy of not relying on deficit-financing bonds for the consumption tax cut, and work was under way within the government to scrape together non-tax revenue. The Ministry of Finance, however, has indicated that much of this non-tax revenue is also expected to go to growth investment and the like, and it should be recognized that also covering a substantial increase in defense spending under these policies was difficult. A corporate tax increase to fund higher defense spending was also considered, but it has been pointed out that raising taxes while asking companies to make growth investments would mean “stepping on the brake and the accelerator at the same time,” and its realization is said to be uncertain.15

The Ministry of Defense, for its part, is said to have proceeded with its estimates in line with the Prime Minister’s policy of “building up the necessary defense spending,” on the assumption that “in reality, even 100 trillion yen would not be enough.”16 The arguments of defense-related actors premised on a substantial increase in defense spending were formed by their threat perceptions of an increasingly severe security environment and by the trend toward fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities since the 2022 three security documents, and in them securing funding is likely to have been taken for granted as the responsibility of politics.

As the reports of the 3.5% plan and the movements in government bond yields discussed above make clear, the difference in the two sides’ concerns had already been emerging before November. A serious gap in perception already existed between defense policy, which aims at full preparedness against immediate threats, and the fiscal policy that underpins it, and it can be said that this gap was exposed in the final stage of the revision of the three documents as a result of Prime Minister Takaichi’s choice to prioritize the consumption tax cut on food and beverages and growth investment.

Conclusion: A New Turn in Security Policy?

Does the emergence of pressure to restrain defense spending mark the beginning of a retreat in Japan’s security policy? This report offers the perspective that restraining defense spending can be seen to have a certain significance even from a standpoint that puts Japan’s defense first.

It is clear that reconciling growth investment with increased defense spending will be a challenge. For growth investment, one of the “two pillars” mentioned above, the government aims for cumulative public and private investment of more than 370 trillion yen by FY2040, and the amount categorized under the “Strong and Prosperous Japan” investment framework in the FY2027 budget requests came to 12.173 trillion yen.17 The Ministry of Defense’s FY2027 budget request amounted to about 8.9 trillion yen, but it was dominated by itemized requests without specified amounts in anticipation of increases under the next three documents, and a ballooning of the budget after the revision of the three documents was regarded as certain. The total defense budget for FY2026 is 9.0353 trillion yen, and if the total budget for the five years from FY2027 were in the 80-trillion-yen range, it would presumably be executed through a phased build-up similar to that under the current three documents. In that case, the defense budget in the final year could reach the 20-trillion-yen range, making it difficult to reconcile with the parallel growth investment. Even after setting aside the consumption tax cut on food and beverages, which is expected to cost about 10 trillion yen over two years, doubts remain as to whether the fiscal burden can be sustained.

On the other hand, growth investment aimed at expanding the size of the economy, even if it acts as pressure to restrain defense spending in the short term, can serve as a foothold for future increases in defense spending. It has been estimated that if the government’s growth investment and growth strategy succeed, Japan’s real GDP growth rate will rise to the mid-to-high 1% range from the 2030s onward, and nominal GDP will approach 1,100 trillion yen in FY2040. Projections about growth investment should of course not be treated as absolute, but in view of long-term security it is natural to find significance in economic policy as a build-up toward securing future defense spending.

John Mearsheimer, a leading scholar of international politics and a representative proponent of offensive realism, discussed in his major work The Tragedy of Great Power Politics the concept of “latent power,” according to which a state’s wealth and population are important factors determining its future military power.18 For Japan, whose military power is already no longer overwhelming relative to that of its neighbors, active measures toward the economy can be seen as a means of expanding its “latent power” and improving its future security environment. The political scientist Kaoru Iokibe (Japanese political and diplomatic history) has pointed out that modern Japan, when faced with security threats, engaged in a “return to the source” (gensen e no sokō), prioritizing investment in the economy in the expectation of allocating greater resources to future military power.19 At a time when optimistic forecasts of the future security environment are hard to make, resource allocation that weighs the present against the future can become a theme for constructive debate on ensuring Japan’s security.

Notes

  1. Reuters, 「防衛費5年で50兆円台、財務省が提示 防衛省は調達削減を企業に伝達=関係者」 [Ministry of Finance proposes defense spending in the 50-trillion-yen range over five years; Ministry of Defense informs companies of procurement cuts, sources say], November 13, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/jp/world/japan/ZA2E7OEBGVJ7FE4LC5O4O6JYQ4-2026-11-13/. ↑
  2. Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, 「第219回国会における高市内閣総理大臣所信表明演説」 [Policy speech by Prime Minister Takaichi to the 219th session of the Diet], October 24, 2025, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/104/statement/2025/1024shoshinhyomei.html. ↑
  3. nippon.com, 「衆院選2026:自民歴史的大勝で3分の2の議席確保、中道は自滅惨敗」 [2026 House of Representatives election: LDP secures two-thirds of seats in historic landslide; “Chūdō” suffers a self-inflicted crushing defeat], February 9, 2026, https://www.nippon.com/ja/japan-data/h02703/. ↑
  4. Kyodo News, 「飲食料品の消費税1%を閣議決定 政府、来年4月から2年間」 [Cabinet approves 1% consumption tax on food and beverages; government to apply it for two years from April next year], August 5, 2026, https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/b3c6216d2c2066aa0070008f74f892de7289ba32. For the government’s policy, see also the Cabinet Secretariat website (https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/shouhizei_zeigakukoujo/index.html). ↑
  5. Bloomberg, 「高市政権、防衛費GDP比3.5%に引き上げ検討 米圧力で試される財政運営」 [Takaichi government considers raising defense spending to 3.5% of GDP; fiscal management tested by US pressure], September 15, 2026, https://www.bloomberg.com/jp/news/articles/2026-09-15/TL127GT9NJLT00. ↑
  6. Jiji Press, 「長期金利上昇3・115% 30年1カ月ぶり高水準」 [Long-term interest rate rises to 3.115%, highest in 30 years and one month], September 25, 2026, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026092500318. ↑
  7. Takahide Kiuchi, 「防衛費の名目GDP比率3.5%への引き上げ観測と長期金利の上昇」 [Speculation about raising defense spending to 3.5% of nominal GDP and the rise in long-term interest rates], Nomura Research Institute, September 15, 2026, https://www.nri.com/jp/media/column/kiuchi/20260915_2.html. ↑
  8. Reuters, 「マクロスコープ:高市首相『国債40兆円』発言、政府与党内に危惧の声 軌道修正も」 [Macroscope: Concern within the government and ruling parties over Prime Minister Takaichi’s “40 trillion yen in government bonds” remark; a course correction is possible], September 14, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/jp/markets/japan/VXHPCEXVIJJ2RAONBP643CIGYQ-2026-11-13/. ↑
  9. Jiji Press, 「防衛力強化、恒久財源見えず=消費減税・積極投資と奪い合い」 [No permanent funding source in sight for the defense buildup, which competes with the consumption tax cut and proactive investment], October 27, 2026, https://sp.m.jiji.com/article/show/3898873. ↑
  10. Reuters, 「防衛費、政府与党内に5年で80兆円案、現行計画の1.8倍」 [Plan for 80 trillion yen in defense spending over five years emerges within the government and ruling parties, 1.8 times the current program], November 2, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/jp/markets/japan/W6PNJTMKYBJGHM3EE64EOD2EBY-2026-11-02/. ↑
  11. Mainichi Shimbun, 「高市首相、『大幅増税』に慎重 防衛費5年50兆~60兆円台案浮上」 [Prime Minister Takaichi cautious about a “substantial tax increase”; plan for 50–60-odd trillion yen in defense spending over five years emerges], November 13, 2026, https://mainichi.jp/articles/20261112/k00/00m/010/277000c. ↑
  12. 「防衛費増額の『遅れと誤算』」 [The “delays and miscalculations” of the defense spending increase], op. cit. ↑
  13. Jiji Press, 「防衛予算、60兆円軸 5年総額、財務・防衛攻防へ――高市首相、増税に消極的」 [Five-year defense budget total to center on 60 trillion yen as the finance and defense ministries clash; Prime Minister Takaichi reluctant to raise taxes], November 13, 2026, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026111301051&g=pol. ↑
  14. Kyodo News, 「自民・維新、防衛産業強化で一致 防衛費規模、不十分との苦言も」 [LDP and Ishin agree on strengthening the defense industry, with complaints that the scale of defense spending is insufficient], November 17, 2026 (carried on Yahoo! News, https://kumanichi.com/articles/2058769); Jiji Press, 「防衛費『5年50兆円台』に批判 自民部会、大幅増額を要求」 [Criticism of “50-trillion-yen range over five years” for defense spending; LDP committee demands a substantial increase], November 18, 2026 (carried on Yahoo! News, https://news.yahoo.co.jp/articles/1ab82648774d1443c3eedf12a1597e2fd8da9802). ↑
  15. 「防衛費増額の『遅れと誤算』」, op. cit. The Ministry of Finance’s position on the use of non-tax revenue is based on 「防衛費5年で50兆円台、財務省が提示」, op. cit. ↑
  16. 「防衛費増額の『遅れと誤算』」, op. cit. ↑
  17. 「日本成長戦略」 [Japan Growth Strategy], Cabinet decision, July 21, 2026, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/nipponseichosenryaku/pdf/jgs2026.pdf. ↑
  18. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). ↑
  19. Kaoru Iokibe, 「日本の政治と軍事の歴史から考える(下)」 [Thinking from the history of politics and the military in Japan (Part 2)], Hōritsu Jihō 97, no. 4 (2025): 86–91. ↑

* The views expressed in this report are solely those of the author and are unrelated to the organizations with which the author is affiliated.